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"They that can give up essential liberty to purchase a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty or safety."
Benjamin Franklin'
"By keeping most aspects of trials out of the public domain, the
United States would be forgoing an opportunity to demonstrate
the imperative of human society based on the rule of law, the
very destruction of which the terrorists who conducted the 11
September attacks sought to achieve."
Louise Doswald-Beck, Secretary-General,
International Commission of Jurists2
I. INTRODUCTION

Sudden, violent terrorist attacks killed thousands of citizens, including
office workers, police, firefighters, and noncombatant military personnel.
Property damage mounted into the tens of billions of dollars.3 In order to bring
the persons responsible for the attacks to justice and to prevent future attacks,
the president declared a state of national emergency. 4 The president and the
legislature swiftly enacted a series of laws designed to assist the police and
military in apprehending, trying, and sentencing persons who committed acts
of terrorism or assisted those who did.5 Because of concerns over retribution
against judges, prosecutors, and other law enforcement personnel, the
president directed that persons accused of terrorism be tried before military
tribunals.' Although some constitutional due process protections were
eliminated in the interest of facilitating law enforcement efforts to combat the
terrorist threat, the public overwhelmingly supported the government's
'RICHARD JACKSON, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA
2

290 (1787).

Letter from Louise Doswald-Beck, Secretary-General, International Conmmission ofJurists,

to President George W. Bush (Dec. 6, 200 1), available at http://icj.org/news.php3?id-article=
2609&lang--en (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
1 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Second
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, Intro., 5, availableat http://www.cidh.oas.
org/counwyrep/Peru2000en/TOC.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Inter-American
Commission].
I ch. 2,164.
Id.
Id.
6 Craig Mauro, Peru Military Court Has Dark Side: Military Tribunals Stamped Out
TerroristThreatsBut ConvictedHundredsofInnocents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 30,2001, at
K6, availableat 2001 WL 28432212.
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actions.7 Most felt that the unprecedented and extraordinary threat faced by
the country called for extraordinary measures in response.8 Citizens therefore
willingly sacrificed some of their constitutional protections in return for
additional safety for themselves individually, and the country as a whole.9
Is this a description of the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001? No; although similar in many respects to the
situation in the United States during the months following September 11,2001,
the events described above occurred in Peru in the 1990s." While Peru never
experienced a single day of cataclysmic death and destruction of the magnitude
experienced by the United States on September 11, Peru's pitched battle with
terrorism resulted in over 24,000 deaths over a twelve-year period and
threatened the very existence of the government." Peru's government seemed
to act in good faith when it enacted draconian measures and suspended the
constitutional rights of its citizens in order to fight the terrorists who were
threatening its existence, and in many ways the measures were successful.'
The terrorist threat has largely been defeated, and peace and stability have
returned to the country. 3 Unfortunately, as evidenced by the following
examples, in the process of defeating the terrorists, Peru developed what is
arguably one of the worst records of human rights abuses in the western
hemisphere.
Luis Alfonso Moncada Vigo, a law student in his final year at the
University of San Marcos in Lima, Peru, was arrested in 1994 and charged
with treason under Peru's Decree Law 25659,' enacted two years earlier to
combat escalating terrorism in the country." Acquitted by a Peruvian military
court, he was kept in prison while the government appealed his acquittal.' 6
When the appellate court affirmed his acquittal, the Supreme Council of

Military Justice sentenced Moncada to twenty years imprisonment for bank
7 Id.

SId.
SId.

'0 See Inter-American Commission, supra note 3. See also Human Rights Watch, Peru,
Presumption of Guilt, Human Rights Violations and the Faceless Courts in Peru, 28 vol. 8, no.
5 (Aug. 1996), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Peru.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2003)
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch].
" Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, intro., 5, 7.
12 Id. at intro.,
10.
, Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, § IV.A.
'4 Decree Law 25659, el Peruano, Aug. 12, 1992.
, Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, § IV.A.
16 Id.
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robbery, a charge that was not included in the indictment against him, and for
which no testimony had been given at trial." Moncada is currently serving his
sentence at the Miguel Castro prison in Lima for a crime against which he had
no chance to defend himself.'8
Another Peruvian law student, Mirtha Ira Bueno Hidalgo, was arrested in
August 1990 under the country's anti-terrorism law, Decree Law 25475."9
Police accused her of distributing literature for the Shining Path, a notorious
terrorist group in Peru. ' ° She was acquitted by the trial court, and the decision
was upheld by the court of appeals." The Supreme Court remanded the case
back to the appellate court, where, without presenting any new evidence,
Bueno was found guilty and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment.' In
violation of internationally accepted standards of due process, Bueno had been
tried twice for the same crime.2
These cases are just two examples of the thousands ofhuman rights abuses
alleged to have occurred in the aftermath of Peru's enactment of anti-terrorism
legislation by international organizations such as the United Nations Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights,24 the Organization of American
States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,2" and by non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch 6 and Amnesty International. Since the events of September 11, the United States has similarly
faced a crisis stemming from terrorism. In response, it has enacted measures
that restrict some rights that have long been considered an integral part of the
U.S. legal system. For example, formerly confidential communications
between an accused and his attorney can now be monitored by the government

17 Id.
S Id.
'9
20

Decree Law 25475, El Peruano, May 5, 1992.
Id.

21 Id.
2 Id.
" Id.
2 See generallyU.N. Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, Civil
and Political Rights, Including Questions of Torture and Detention, Report of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Addendum, Report on the Mission to Peru, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/63/Add.2 (1999), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/
TestFrame/2fbc 28ab04eeec 1802567320037971 fOpendocument (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
See also Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, ch. 1, 35.
" See generally Inter-American Commission, supra note 3.
u Human Rights Watch, supra note 10.
27 See generallyArmnesty International, Report 2001, Peru, (2001) at http://web.arnmesty.org/
web/ar200l .nsf/webanircountries/PERU?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 16, 2001).
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in some circumstances," and access to counsel of choice can be, and was,
denied for a period in at least one instance." Much of the rhetoric in support
of this legislation is similar to that heard in Peru when drastic legislative
reforms were enacted; in essence, the sacrifice of some freedom is an
acceptable price to pay when faced with certain types of threats.3 0 The
parallels between the situations faced by the two countries, separated by less
than a decade, are obvious. If the United States is to avoid the tragic
consequences suffered by the Peruvian people that resulted from their
government's attempt to combat terrorism, it must learn from history and avoid
Peru's mistakes. This Note examines one of the measures taken by the United
States in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the establishment of
military tribunals by the president's Military Order of November 13, 2001.1
It compares the U.S. military tribunals to similar measures taken by Peru a
decade earlier, measures that resulted in widespread abuses of basic human
rights of its own citizens. It argues that while many important aspects of the
situations in the two countries differ, the United States, like Peru in the 1990s,
may be violating international law in its efforts to deal with the terrorism
problem, and is running the risk of doing more damage than good in the long
term.
Section I sets forth the purpose and scope of this Note. Section II discusses
the history of Peru's terrorism crisis and the legal measures that established its
military tribunals. Section III describes the operation ofU.S. military tribunals
as set forth in the Military Order and analyzes potential problems associated
with their operation, both under the United States Constitution and under
international law. Finally, Section IV presents conclusions.
II. PERU'S -ISTORY OF TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION

In 1980, Peru returned to a democratic form of government after twelve
years of military rule that had left the country with serious economic problems
and an escalating threat from internal terrorist organizations. From 1980 to

"' Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001).
2 John Hendren, Response To Terror;Lawyers in Tribunals to Face Daunting Task; Justice,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A3, availableat 2001 WL 28940290.
10 See Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, ch. 2,164. See also Richard A. Posner,
Security Versus Civil Liberties,ATLAMIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 46.
"' Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
" Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, intro., 14 (the primary terrorist organizations
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1992, the period in which the level of violence rose most dramatically, 24,250
people died as the result of political violence in Peru: this figure included
2,044 members of the security forces, 10,171 civilians, 11,773 persons alleged
to be members of armed dissident groups, and 262 persons allegedly linked to
drug trafficking.3 3 The violence perpetrated by the terrorist groups became so

severe that it presented a grave danger to the stability of the country.' In
response to this crisis, President Alberto Fujimori instituted the Government
of Emergency and National Reconstruction in 1992. s Under the emergency
powers given to him, President Fujumori dissolved the Congress and removed
the majority of judges and prosecutors at all levels, replacing them with
provisional judges.3" He also suspended Article 2(20)(g) of the Peruvian
Constitution, thus allowing the police and military forces to detain persons
without judicial authorization.37
As the violence continued to escalate, Peru enacted two pieces of
legislation that drastically changed the face of Peru's legal system; Decree
Laws 25475 and 25659. 31 Violations of Decree Law 25475 were adjudicated
by "faceless" civilian courts, where the identities of judges, prosecutors, and
law enforcement officials were concealed, and violations of Decree Law 25659
were adjudicated by similarly "faceless" military tribunals.39 While Decree
Law 25475 purports to focus on acts of terrorism and Decree Law 25659 on
acts of treason, in effect both laws deal with acts of terrorism, albeit through
different venues. Indeed, the acts of "treason" within the scope of Decree Law
25659 were defined as acts of terrorism that differed only slightly from those
defined in Decree Law 25475.'
The governmentjustified the suspension of civil liberties guaranteed under
the Peruvian Constitution by the need to take extraordinary measures to

were the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Moviriento Revolucionario Tfipac Amaru
(MRTA)).
33Id. 5.

I d. 7.
3 Id. ch. 2,164 (one of the actions taken by the Government of Emergency and National
Reconstruction was the complete reorganization of the Judiciary, the Court of constitutional
Guarantees, the National Council of the Judiciary, the Public Ministry, and the Office of the
Controller General of the Republic. The Emergency Government dissovled the Congress and
removed numerous judgers and prosecutors at all levels).
6 Id.

37 Id. ch. 2,
38Id. ch. 2,

83.
64.

- Id. ch. 2,

159.

39

Id.
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address the terrorist threat that was jeopardizing the stability of the country."
Decree Law 25475 defines terrorism very broadly as an act that:
[p]rovokes, creates, or maintains a state of anxiety, alarm, or fear
in the population or in a sector thereof, performs acts against life,
the body, health, personal liberty and security, or against
property, against the security ofpublic buildings, roads, or means
ofcommunication or of transport of any type, energy or transmission towers, motorized facilities or any other good or service,
using arms, explosive materials or artifacts, or any other means
capable of causing damage or grave disturbance of the public
peace, or affect the international relations or the security of
society and the State.42
Decree Law 25475 vests responsibility for investigating and prosecuting
crimes of terrorism in the Direcci6n National contra el Terrorismo
(DINCOTE). 43 DINCOTE is authorized to decide whether evidence it collects
is sufficient for an indictment, which charges are filed, and whether the
accused will appear before a civilian or a military court.' Under Decree Law
25475, police are authorized to detain persons incommunicado for up to fifteen
days, and are only required to notify the judge and the Public Ministry within
twenty-four hours after an arrest.4' Furthermore, counsel for the accused is
prohibited from intervening on behalf of his client until after the accused
makes a statement to the Public Ministry." Attorneys are also prohibited from
representing more than one defendant who has been charged under Decree
Law 25475 at one time.4 7 These restrictions severely curtail the due process
rights of Peruvian citizens charged under this law.
Article 15 of Decree Law 25475 provided for secret tribunals and
"faceless" courts. It stated,
[t]he identity of the judges and members of the Public Ministry,
and of the justice auxiliaries who intervene in the trial of crimes
4" Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, § I.
42 Decree

43 Id.

"Id.
45 Id.
"d.
47 Id.

Law 25475, El Peruano, May 5, 1992.
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of terrorism, shall be secret, to which end measures will be
adopted to guarantee that measure. The judicial rulings shall not
bear signatures or seals of the judges participating, nor of the
justice auxiliaries. For this purpose, codes and keys will be used,
which shall also be kept secret."
Secrecy pervaded every facet of the process. The judges were invisible to the
defendants and their counsel at all times, and trial proceedings were conducted
in private .49 Hearings took place in specially equipped courtrooms inside highsecurity prisons or, in treason cases, at military bases.' The courtrooms were
small, with a single door and a large one-way mirror along one wall.5 Judges,
the prosecutor and court secretaries sat in an adjoining room on the other side
of the mirror.52 They communicated with the accused persons and their
counsel through voice-distorting microphones." At times, poor audio quality
from the sound system made it impossible for the defendant or his or her
counsel to understand what was being said.5' Defense counsel were often
forced to wear hoods without vision openings during travel to and from the
secret tribunals, and during the trial itself.5"
Article 13 ofDecree Law 25475 establishes a rigid time limit of thirty days,
extendable in some cases to fifty days, for pretrial investigation into charges
of terrorist activities.56 This is significantly less than the four months normally
allowed for other criminal investigations, and restricts the ability of defense
counsel to gather sufficient information to present an adequate defense."
Article 13 also prohibits the appearance of police or military personnel who
participated in the interrogation as witnesses at trial, ruling out any possibility
of cross examination by defense counsel. 8 The law also provides for secret
witnesses whose identities are kept from the defense throughout the trial.59
4Id.(while Decree Law 25475 remains in effect, the faceless courts described herein have
since been abolished).
"9 Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, ch. 2,
50 Id.
st Id.
S2 Id.
53 Id.
S4

Id.

s Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, § III.E.
56 Decree Law 25475, El Peruano, May 5, 1992.
" Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, § III.A.
s Decree Law 25475, El Peruano, May 5, 1992.
s9 Id.

106.
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Defense counsel is not permitted to see, interview, or cross examine these
witnesses.6 °
This extreme secrecy had been designed to protect courts and law
enforcement personnel from retribution.6 ' Many judges and prosecutors had
been assassinated by terrorists attempting to intimidate the courts and hamper
the prosecution of terrorists.6 2 However, it is questionable whether the secrecy
provides any real protection for the identities of court personnel, particularly
in the provinces and small towns, where terrorists could still determine the
identities of judges and prosecutors with relative ease.63
Decree Law 25659, in contrast, deals with the crime of Traici6n a la Patria
(i.e. treason)." Article 1 defines treason as the commission of those acts
defined in Decree Law 25475 through certain means such as the use of
explosives, causing injury to persons or property.65 It also establishes that the
leaders and members of terrorist organizations who perform the physical
elimination of persons are guilty of treason.' Unlike violations of Decree Law
25475, which are the responsibility of civilian courts, the military has
jurisdiction over violations of Decree Law 25659.67
A. Effects of Peru'sAnti-terrorismLegislation
Because only a small portion of the country remains in a state of emergency," it appears that Peru's draconian measures to combat terrorism were
successful in reducing the incidence of terrorist violence in the country.
Unfortunately, Peru's success came at a high cost to the human rights of its
citizens. Approximately 3,900 Peruvian citizens were convicted of terrorism
and related offenses by the "faceless" special courts.69 The Peruvian
government has also admitted that innocent persons were unjustly convicted
by Peru's justice system. In 1996, President Fujimori, addressing the issue of

6

Id.

6

See Mauro, supra note 6.

62

Id.

63 Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, ch. 2,
"

105.

Decree Law 25659, El Peruano, Aug. 12, 1992.

65 Id.

66Id.
67 Id.
68 Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, intro.,

in a state of emergency).
69 Mauro, supra note 6.

10 (only six percent of Peru remains

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 31:423

unjustly imprisoned persons, stated, "We recognize that such a situation exists
and we are doing all we can. We would like to have a mechanism soon to
allow us to bring justice to those who are unjustly in detention. We don't
doubt that such people exist ..."7o In 1996, the government established a

commission to review convictions.7 By the end of 2000, 600 persons, known
as los inocentes, had been released through the work of the commission.72 No
one knows exactly how many more innocent persons remain in prison.73 These
numbers are a testament to the abuses that occurred as a result of Peru's
approach of suspending the basic civil rights of its citizens to ensure their
safety.
As a result of the government's actions, Peru's record of human rights
abuses is well known in the international community. In addition to the abuses
noted by the Organization of American States' Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in its Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Peru, 4 other international organizations have cited serious human rights abuses
in Peru resulting from its anti-terrorism legislation. These organizations
include the United Nations Committee Against Torture," the United Nations

70 Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, § III.
71Mauro, supra note 6.
2 Id.

73Id.

' See Inter-American Commission, supra note 3.
71Id. ch. 1, 34. Expressing concern for:
a. the continuing numerous allegations of torture; b. the lack of 'independence' of those members of the judiciary who have no security of tenure; c. the
period of incommunicado pre-trial detention of 15 days for persons suspected
of acts of terrorism; d. the use of military courts to try civilians; e. the
automatic penalty of at least 1 year of solitary confinement from the date of
the trial of anyone convicted of a terrorism offence; f. the apparent lack of
effective investigation and prosecution of those who are accused of having
committed acts of torture; g. the use of, in particular, the amnesty laws which
preclude prosecution of alleged torturers who must, according to Articles 4,
5 and 12 of the Convention, be investigated and prosecuted where appropriate; h. the maintenance in some parts of the country of emergency laws which
abrogate ordinary human rights protection; i. the special prison regime
applicable to convicted terrorists and in particular to convicted terrorist
leaders; j. the failure of the Attorney General's Office to keep a precise
register of persons who claim that they have been tortured.
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Human Rights Committee,76 the World Organization Against Torture," the
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,7" and
the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women.79 As evidenced by the concerns expressed by these organizations,
Peru's success against terrorism came at a very high price, both to its citizens
and to its standing in the international community.
B. CurrentStatus of PeruvianAnti-terrorism Legislation

With only a few minor changes, the severe curtailment of Peruvian citizens'
civil liberties brought about by anti-terrorism legislation remains unchanged,"
despite the fact that the terrorist threat has all but disappeared."' Decree Law
2624882 made it possible for persons accused of terrorism to be released
without bail while under investigation for the crime of terrorism; this had been
banned under the original version of Decree Law 25475.83
Other relatively minor changes to the system have been enacted in Decree
Law 26447." Article 2 of the Law restored some due process rights pertaining
to defense counsel, giving persons accused of terrorism the right to counsel of
their choice, and the right to have counsel present from the outset of the police
investigation. It established a requirement that defense counsel be present

76 Id. ch. 1, 35 (concluding, "In a system of trail by 'faceless judges,' neither the
independence nor the impartiality of the judges is guaranteed, since the tribunal, being
established ad hoc, may comprise serving members of the armed forces").
" Id. ch. 1, 36 (expressing concern over information it received from two former against
of the Peruvian intelligence corps, who allegedly admitted that they received training, by their
superiors, in the torture of detainees).
" Id. ch. 1, 38 (expressing concern over what is characterized as, "the close relationship
[in Peru] between socio-economic underdevelopment and the phenomena of ethnic or racial
discrimination against part ofthe population, chiefly the indigenous and peasant communities").
"' Id. ch. 1, 41 (expressing concern over "the situation of women who have been displaced
from their places of origin with their families as a result of terrorist activity," and recommending
that the greatest possible care should be given to such women, who, in the main, were heads of
household, and who should be the beneficiaries of programmes to promote their participation
in the labour force together with access for them and their families to education, health care,
housing, drinking, water and other essential services).
'0 Id. ch. 2, 116.
SI Id. intro. 10.
82 Decree Law 26248, El Peruano, Nov. 24, 1993.
83

Decree Law 25475, supra note 42.

"Decree Law 26447, El Peruano, Apr. 20, 1995.
ssId. at art. 2.
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any time the defendant makes a statement, and provides public defenders for
persons who do not choose their own counsel."6 Article 4 reestablishes that
persons under eighteen years of age may not be sentenced as an adult;87 under
the original anti-terrorism legislation, the minimum age for sentencing had
been fifteen years.
Finally, Decree Law 26671 ended the practice of
"faceless" courts.8 9 These changes have restored some of the due process
protections afforded to persons charged under Peru's anti-terrorism laws, and
may be reflective of the Peruvian government's recognition of the human
rights abuses that resulted from its efforts to fight terrorism.
L9. UNITED STATES ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
A. Military Tribunals
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government
moved swiftly to enact legislation and implement other legal measures
designed to combat the terrorist threat." The Executive Order establishing
military tribunals to try certain persons accused of terrorist acts was issued on
November 13.9" Put into effect a little over two months after the attacks, it
provides that certain persons may be tried by military tribunals for offenses
related to acts of terrorism.9 2 The Military Order itself contains few details
concerning how the military tribunals will function, a fact which caused a great
deal of concern among civil libertarians in the United States, and among

8

Id.

I at art. 4.
Id.
88 Decree Law 25475, supra note 42.
89 Decree Law 26671, El Peruano, Oct. 11, 1997.
o See Military Order, supra note 31. See also Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (signed into law by the president on
October 26, 2001, six weeks after the attacks); Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism,
28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001) (changing U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Prison regulations
to permit law enforcement officials to monitor attorney/client communications under certain
circumstances, promulgated seven weeks after the attacks); Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 40101 (2002) (signed into law by the president ten weeks after the attacks);
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1701 (2002) (enacted over
twelve months after the attacks).
91 Military Order, supra note 3 1.
92 Id.
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foreign governments and international organizations, about potential abuses of
accused persons' human rights. 3
The Military Order states the following with respect to persons who are
subject to trial by United States military tribunals:
(a) The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any
individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to
whom I [the president] determine from time to time in writing
that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the
relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaeda;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to
commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have
as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the
United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy,
or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals
described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1)
of this order; and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual
be subject to this order."
United States citizens are expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of military
tribunals.9'
The Military Order authorizes the Secretary of Defense to develop "such
orders and regulations . . . as may be necessary to carry out any of the

provisions of this order."

On March 21, 2002, Secretary of Defense

"' See, e.g., Memorandum from Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union, to Interested Persons (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/
congress/I 112901b.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2003); Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive
Director, Human Rights Watch, to President George W. Bush (Nov. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/1 I/miltribsltrl I 15.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003); DoswaldBeck, supra note 2.
Military Order, supra note 3 1, § 2(a).

SId.
"Id. § 4(b).
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Rumsfeld announced procedures that will govern many aspects of military
tribunal operations.97 The procedures that Rumsfeld announced include many
protections for defendants provided by civilian courts in the United States,
including provisions for plea bargaining," the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty," the provision of a military lawyer at no charge to the defendant
and permission to use a civilian lawyer paid for by the defendant, °0 the
standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt' (the same as that used in
civilian criminal trials), and the ability of a defendant to present evidence in
his defense, and to cross examine prosecution witnesses.0 2 In contrast,
Peruvian tribunals curtailed defendants' right to cross-examine prosecution
evidence and witnesses by not permitting defendants to cross examine police
officers or military personnel who provided evidence against them.0 3
Defendants will also be protected against double jeopardy", and self
incrimination. 0 5 Defendants will have access to evidence the prosecution
intends to present against them, but if the evidence is classified, defendants
and their civilian attorneys will be barred from such access." ° Military
defense lawyers, if utilized by the defendants, would be granted access to
classified prosecution evidence.0 7 Likewise, while the proceedings will
normally be open to the public and press, if classified information is to be
presented, the tribunal proceedings maybe closed, and even the defendants and
°
their civilian counsel may be excluded from the courtroom. 'O
Evidentiary standards for U.S. military tribunals will be less stringent than
those of civilian courts. For example, hearsay will be permitted because,
according to Secretary Rumsfeld, "in wartime it may be difficult to locate

" John Mintz, Tribunal Rules Aim to Shield Witnesses; Judges, Prosecutors May be
Anonymous, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at Al, availableat 2002 WL 17584683.
" FrankJ. Murray, Terrorism TrialsModeled After Tribunalsof WWII, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WL 2907152.
"Sally Buzbee, PentagonSays TribunalRulesProtectTerrorSuspects-But LimitedRight
to Appeal and LooserEvidence StandardsDrawCriticism, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 22, 2002, at 5,
availableat 2002 WL 17059331.
100 Id.
101Id.
'm Id.

Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, ch. 2,
"oBuzbee, supranote 99.

'"

1o5
Id.

106Id.
107Id.
108Id.

179.
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witnesses."' 9 Chain of custody requirements will be relaxed as well because
conventional chain of custody requirements are difficult to comply with under
battlefield conditions. " 0 The general standard for introduction of evidence
will be whether it has probative value to a reasonable person, a lower standard
than that used in civilian courts and military courts martial."'
Judges will be military officers; juries will be comprised of three to seven
military officers, with seven required for death penalty cases." 2 Unlike
civilian criminal courts where a unanimous jury verdict is required to convict,
a conviction by the military tribunals will only require a two thirds majority of
the jury." 3 A sentence of death will require a unanimous vote of the sevenofficer jury." 4
All convictions by the military tribunals will be automatically reviewed by
a special panel made up of one military officer and two outside experts
deputized by the president.' The president or the Secretary of Defense have
the final say on sentences of death."' In accordance with the provisions of the
Military Order, the procedures bar appeals to federal appellate courts, or direct
appeals to the Supreme Court." 7 The Military Order states:
[t]he individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or
maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any
such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in
(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any
court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international
commission." 8
However, the Defense Department has acknowledged that it cannot prevent the
Supreme Court from intervening if it chooses to do so." 9 Pentagon policy
director Douglas Feith stated, "[i]t's not within our power to exclude the
109Id.
110Patrick Smyth, Terrorist Suspects Get More Rights in U.S. Trials, IRISH TIMEs, Mar. 22,

2002, at P12, available at 2002 WL 15897927.
...
Buzbee, supra note 99.
112 Id.
113Id.
"14 Id.
11s Id.
116Smyth, supra note 110.
117

119
"t

Military Order, supra note 31, § 7(b)(2).
Military Order, supra note 31.
Murray, supra note 98.
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Supreme Court from the process,"' 0 and Pentagon General Counsel William
J.Haynes II said, "[flar be it from me to tell the Supreme Court not to do
something."121

Commenting on a similar appeals procedure employed by Peruvian military
tribunals, where the appeals body was also composed of military personnel, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated that such a procedure
violates Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention on Human Rights
(American Convention)." The Commission declared that the right to appeal
"is not satisfied merely because there is a higher court than the one that tried
and convicted the accused and to which the latter has or may have recourse...
the [appeals] court was part of the military structure and as such did not have
the [necessary] independence.... ." The United States signed the American
Convention on June 1, 1977, but never ratified it;' thus, the Inter-American
Commission's finding regarding Peru's similar appeals process for its military
tribunals may suggest that the United States does not comply with recognized
international standards in its provisions for appeals from the decisions of its
military tribunals.
In a move disturbingly similar to Peru's "faceless" courts, the Pentagon
plans to protect judges, prosecutors, and witnesses from retribution by
allowing them to remain anonymous during the trial.' 25 Some witnesses may
testify from remote locations via telephone or closed circuit television, with
their voices altered electronically." If these plans are carried out actually
exercised by the Pentagon, they may further degrade the due process
protections of persons being tried before U.S. military tribunals, and expose
the government to heightened domestic and international criticism.
The 620 prisoners at the United States detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base continue to be interrogated by military investigators without
the presence ofcounsel. 27
' Commenting on Peruvian citizens' lack of adequate
120

Id.

121

Id.

122American

Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. See also
Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, ch. 2, 182.
'
Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, at ch. 2, 182.
1 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Signatures and Current Status of
Ratifications, American Convention on Human Rights, at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/
basic4.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
"uMintz, supra note 97.
126

Id.

"2Paisley Dodds, US. Defends Guantanamo Detentions, A.P. ONLINE, Jan. 17, 2003,
availableat 2003 WL 9524202.
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access to defense counsel, a requirement of Article 8(2)(d) of the American
Convention, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights criticized the
Peruvian government's procedure of not permitting an accused to see his
attorney until after he made a statement to the government. The InterAmerican Commission further stated that the procedure violated the accused's
right to counsel, and his freedom from self-incrimination.128 The United
States' practice of interrogating prisoners while denying them access to
counsel may likewise be in violation of international standards of due process
as reflected in the American Convention, as well as the International Covenant
or Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party. 29
To date, no detainees from the U.S. war on terror have been tried under the
military tribunal system established under the Military Order, and no trials
have been scheduled, 30 despite the fact that some of the detainees have been
held at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility for over a year.' The final
decision as to whether to try a detainee before a military tribunal will be made
by the president. ' No charging or sentencing guidelines have yet been issued
by the government; the March 21, 2002 rules announced by the Pentagon state
only that tribunal jurisdiction covers "laws of war" and "all other offenses
triable by military commissions" without specifying what they are.'
The
rules contain no sentencing guidelines beyond punishment "appropriate to the
offense."' 34 The Defense Department is expected to issue a manual of "crimes
and elements" that prosecutors will use to formulate charges. 3 ' The
government has been moving slowly to begin tribunal proceedings because its
priority in dealing with the detainees is to gain intelligence information by
interrogating them, not to prosecute them. 3 ' As of December 2002, none of
the detainees have been charged with a crime, and there have been no hearings

8
9

Inter-American Commission, supra note 3, ch. 2, 177.
InternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.GAOR, 21 st

Sess., Supp. No. 16, at art. 14 3(b), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].
130Frank Davies, US. Readies Tribunalsfor Trials: GuidelinesFrom WWI1 to Play Role,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 27, 2002, at P5C, available at 2002 WL 104625469.
131 Id.
132

Id.

133Jess Bravin, Military TribunalDefendantsGet FewerRights andProcedural
Rules, WALL

ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A4, availableat 2002 WL-WSJ 3389555.
134Id.
"' Joan Ryan, All Eyes on Our Military Tribunals, S.F.

CHRON.,

availableat 2002 WL 4038209. See also Davies, supra note 130.
' Davies, supra note 130.

Dec. 15, 2002, at E4,
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to determine if any of the men have been incarcerated by mistake, in contrast
37
to nearly 1,200 such hearings that took place during and after the Gulf War.
Many detainees may be facing the possibility of indefinite detention
without being charged. 3 U.S. officials are having difficulty obtaining
sufficient information about many detainees to formulate charges, and yet will
not release them if the government considers them dangerous.'39 Likewise,
Secretary Rumsfeld stated that even persons who are tried and acquitted by
military tribunals may not be released if considered dangerous.1 41 The
government claims the right to detain the prisoners under the provision of the
Geneva Convention which allow prisoners of war to be held for the duration
of the conflict,' 4' while at the same time claiming that the detainees are not
entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention because of their status as
unlawful combatants. 42
B. Legality of Military Tribunals Under United States Law
Any comparison between the use of military tribunals in the United States
and their use in Peru must consider first the legitimacy of the United States'
military tribunals under United States law. Perhaps more than any other single
action taken by the United States government in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Military Order has generated a firestorm of
controversy, both domestically and internationally. One of the primary points
of contention is whether the president has the authority to establish the military
tribunals in the current situation. On January 4, 2002, the American Bar
Association's Task Force on Terrorism and the Law issued its Report and
Recommendations on Military Commissions.4 3 The ABA Terrorism Task

' Ryan, supra note 135.
.. John Mintz, Some Detainees May be HeldEven ifAcquitted, WASH. POST, Mar. 29,2002,
at A7, available at 2002 WL 17586461.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, § II, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/htl/
menu3/b/91.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Geneva Convention for Prisoners of

War].
14 Jonathan Fowler, Red Cross: ThousandsofLettersDeliveredforGuantanamoDetainees,
A.P. ONLjNE, Jan. 13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2927023.
143 ABA Terrorism Task Force, American Bar Association, Report and Recommendations on
Military Commissions (Jan. 4,2002), availableat http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2003) [hereinafter ABA Terrorism Task Force).
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Force concluded (1) there is extensive historical authority under the Constitution and United States law supporting the president's establishment of military
tribunals in wartime; (2) Congress authorized the president to use armed force
against those persons, organizations and states responsible for the September
11 attacks; (3) the Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that a state
of war may exist without formal declaration; (4) military tribunals have been
used in periods other than declared war; (5) the scope of the president's
authority to establish military tribunals without express Congressional
authorization has not been developed in case law, but the president's
constitutional authority to do so is strongest when the president consults with
and has the support of Congress; (6) military tribunals have authority to try
persons for violations of the law of war, and it can be reasonably argued that
the September 11 attacks were such violations; (7) absent additional authority
from Congress, military tribunals do not have authority to try persons for
crimes other than violations of the law of war; (8) the Military Order can be
interpreted to apply to offenses that are not violations of the law of war, and
that are not connected to the September 11 attacks; (9) the Military Order
applies to all non-citizens, including aliens lawfully present in the United
States, raising serious questions about the constitutionality of this provision of
the Military Order under existing precedent; (10) military tribunals are subject
to habeas corpus proceedings in federal court, at least with respect to persons
present in the United States; and (11) the United States is a signatory to the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and international
tribunals for war crimes should follow the basic standards and procedures
contained in Article 14 of that instrument.'"
Military tribunals derive their authority from Articles I and II of the United
States Constitution." 5 The Constitution gives Congress the powers: "[t]o...
provide for the common Defence....,"" 6 "[t]o define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations,"' 4 7" [t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water"""; "[t]o raise and support
Armies... ,"91 "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,"' 0 and "[t]o make Rules

'44

14

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 2.

U.S. CONST. art.
Id. art. I, § 8, c.
148 Id. art. I, § 8, c.
149 Id. art. I, § 8, c.
Id. art. I, § 8, c.
146

147

I, § 8, c. I.
10.
II.
12.
13.
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for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.''.

Moreover, Article II gives the president the "executive Power"' and makes
him the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States ....,13
Congress provided for military tribunals in Article 21 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, which states,
[t]he provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost
courts, or other military commissions of concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law
of war may be tried by military commission, provost court, or
other military commissions."
' the case most often cited in support of the president's
In ExparteQuirin, 55
power to establish military tribunals, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
jurisdiction ofa military tribunal ordered by President Roosevelt during World
War II to try eight German saboteurs captured in the United States. 5 The
Court stated, "[b]y the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has
explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
commissions shall havejurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law
of war in appropriate cases."' 57 The Court expressly left open the question of
whether the president's power as commander-in-chief alone is sufficient
authority to establish a military tribunal, since Congress had expressly given
the president that power in Article of War I 5. 's
Critics of the Military Order have questioned the president's authority to
establish military tribunals except in situations when Congress has made a
formal declaration of war.'59 Quirin and a number of other related cases

151Id. art. I, § 8, c1. 14.
352 Id. art. II, § 1.
'5 Id. art. 1I, § 2.
" Uniform Code of Military Justice, Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial Not Exclusive, 10
U.S.C.A. § 821 (2001) [hereinafter U.C.M.J. Article 21].
155 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
'

Id.

...
Id. at 28.
U. ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 3 (U.C.M.J. Article 21 is materially
identical to its predecessor, Article of War 15).
19 Id. at 5; see also Edgar, supranote 93.
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Supreme Court and Congress have recognized, however, that a state of war
may exist without a formal declaration.'" Military tribunals have been used
in hostilities in which there was no declaration of war, including the Civil War
and the Indian Wars."

Nothing in U.C.M.J. Article 21 or elsewhere in the

Code or other statutes expressly
prohibits the use of military tribunals when
63
war has not been declared. 1
In addition to historical precedent supporting the establishment of military
tribunals, Congress has also provided support for their existence. On
September 18, 2001, Congress enacted a joint resolution authorizing the
president:
[t]o use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations, or persons.'"
Thus, it can reasonably be argued that Congress' authorization to use "all
necessary and appropriate force" includes authority for the president to
establish military tribunals, at least with respect to offenses related to the
September 11 attacks. 65
By its terms, U.C.M.J. Article 21 limits the jurisdiction of military tribunals
to "offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by
military commissions."'" No statute other than U.C.M.J. Article 21 relating
to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal appears to apply in the current
circumstances, so the exercise ofjurisdiction by a military tribunal established
by the Military Order must be under the law of war. 67 That jurisdiction
generally rests on either of two bases: (1) military occupation, or (2) prosecution for violations of the law of war; only the latter applies to the current
"6ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 3.
Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
161

I" Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
'~' ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 6.
166 U.C.M.J. Article 21, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2001).
' ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 6.
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situation.' In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court recognized that military
tribunals are proper fora for the trial of violations of the law of war,'69 and this
jurisdiction also applies to non-state actors such as al Qaeda.' However, the
Military Order potentially applies to a much broader group of people than
those who may have committed war crimes. In addition to those directly
responsible for the September 11 attacks, it expressly applies to members of
al Qaeda, persons complicit in acts of international terrorism, and those who
have harbored such persons.'
The fact that these latter offenses are not limited to the September 11
attacks, or even necessarily related to them, raises several questions. First, it
is not clear that membership in al Qaeda alone, or harboring terrorists alone,
violates the law of war, which is the necessary predicate to the jurisdiction of
a military tribunal under both common law and U.C.M.J. Article 21.172
Additionally, it is not clear that all acts of international terrorism are
necessarily violations of the law of war.' Therefore, specific authority from
Congress appears to be necessary in order to apply the Military Order to
persons other than those involved in the September 11 attacks. 74 Second, the
Military Order's application of military tribunals to acts not associated with
the September 11 attacks would uncouple the authority of such military
tribunals from Congress' September 18 joint resolution,'" which authorized
force against those who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks on September 11 "" Using a military tribunal to address offenses
unrelated to the September II attacks raises serious questions of constitutional
and statutory authority in the absence of further authority from Congress.'
The applicability of the Military Order is limited to persons who are not
citizens of the United States. 7 Non-citizens prosecuted under the Military
Order could fall into two broad categories: those outside and those within the
United States. Aliens outside United States territory have few, if any

"

Id.

'69 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942).
170ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 7.

Military Order, supra note 31.
ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 9.
173
id.
174 id.
'k"
'

17Sid.

to Use Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
m ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 9.

176 Authorization

'n

Military Order, supra note 31, § 2(a).
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constitutional protections. '" However, aliens present within the United States,
including those residing unlawfully, are entitled to the same constitutional due
process protections provided by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution as citizens."w In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court
upheld jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try a United States citizen for
offenses committed in the United States because the citizen was a "belligerent"
in a declared war. 8 ' It distinguished another case, ExparteMilligan,' s2 which

held that a military tribunal lacked jurisdiction to try a citizen who was not a
belligerent for offenses committed in the United States. " ' The Military Order
excludes citizens from the jurisdiction of military tribunals, but arguably the
belligerent/non-belligerent distinction drawn in the Quirin and Milligan cases
may have some relevance to the application of the Military Order to aliens in
the United States.'"M
The issue is further complicated by the difficulty inherent in defining who
is a "belligerent" in the current situation.

"

Exparte Quirin suggests that an

exception to constitutional due process protections may exist for a person who
enters the United States illegally in order to commit a war crime.' 8 Subjecting
non-citizens outside the United States to the jurisdiction of military tribunals
raises the least likelihood of constitutional issues."8 7 However, such jurisdiction over aliens already present in the United States, particularly those present
lawfully, raises more serious questions in light of constitutional due process
protections for all 'persons' within the United States, not just citizens.'

'7 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that German nationals, confined
in custody of United States Army in Germany following conviction by military tribunal ofhaving
engaged in military activity against United States in China after surrender of Germany, had no
right to writ of habeas corpus to test legality of their detention). See also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
the search by American authorities of the Mexican residence of a Mexican citizen and resident
who had no voluntary attachment to the United States).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,693 (2001) (holding the Due Process Clause applies to
all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent).
,81Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,44 (1942).
182 Expare Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
183 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at45.
184 ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 10 n.24.

18 Id.
1s6 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 31:423

The Military Order and the subsequent rules issued by the Defense
Department preclude appellate review by civilian courts. 8 9 However, neither
the Military Order or its implementing rules expressly suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, nor is it likely that they could do so."9 Although the Supreme
Court has held that military tribunals are outside the normal process ofjudicial
review,"' it has nevertheless reviewed applications for writ of habeas corpus
by persons being tried by military tribunal. 92 The Court has carried out habeas
corpus reviews even in the face of language in the implementing Executive
Order that purported to bar judicial review,'9 3 much like that in the current
Military Order.'19
C. Legality ofMilitary Tribunals Under InternationalLaw
In addition to concerns about the president's authority to establish military
tribunals and the constitutionality of theirjurisdiction, there are also questions
concerning their legality under international law and their effect on international relations. These concerns include possible violations of the ICCPR and
the Geneva Convention.
International standards for legal due process fall generally into the
following categories: protection against detention or other punishment that is
not based on an officially alleged violation of an established law (i.e. arbitrary
detention);'9 5 the right of the accused to know the charges against him; 9 the
right to promptness, both at an accused's initial appearance before a tribunal,
"9See Military Order, supra note 31; see also Buzbee, supranote 99.
19'See Buzbee, supra note 99, at 11.
'9' Exparte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863).
,9 See, e.g., Madison v. Kinsella, 342 U.S. 341 (1952); Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1 (1946); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). But see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950) (denying habeas corpus review of the jurisdiction of a military commission outside the
United States to try an enemy alien who was never in the United States, for war crimes alleged
to have been committed outside the United States).
'9 ABA Terrorism Task Force, supra note 143, at 11.
'9 Military Order, supra note 31, § 7(b)(2).
'9 See UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art.
9 (1948); ICCPR,supra note 129, art. 9 1; Body ofPrinciplesforthe ProtectionofAll Persons
UnderAny Form ofDetention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 173, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp.
49, princs. 2, 4, 30, U.N. Doc. A/43 (1988); Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners,U.N. Doc. [ST/DPI/832, 30 (1984).
196ICCPR, supra note 129, at art. 9, 2, art. 14, 3(a) and (f); Body of Principlesfor the
ProtectionofA 1 PersonsUnderAnyFormofDetention orImprisonment,supranote 195, princ.

10.
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and to the conduct of the trial or other proceeding; 97 the right to not be tried
in absentia"9 " and to be heard by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal; 9 the right to the presumption of innocence unless proven guilty;2°°
protection against ex post facto laws; 20' protection against invasions of privacy
unless specifically provided for by law;20 2 the right to be defended by counsel
of choice, and for counsel to be provided without cost for those without
sufficient means; 203 the right to confidential communications with counsel; 2'
the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense;2 5 the conditional
right to release pending trial;' the right against self incrimination; 2 7 the right
to examine prosecution witnesses and to obtain the testimony of witnesses in
his defense; 28 the right of appeal; 2 " the right not to be tried for the same

' ICCPR,supra note 129, art. 9,
3; Body ofPrinciplesfor the ProtectionofAll Persons
Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 195, princs. 11, 33 4, 37-38.
'"ICCPR,supra note 129, art. 14,1 3(d).
'
UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights, supra note 195, art. 10; ICCPR,supranote 129,
art. 14,911.
200 UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights, supranote 195, art. 11,1 1; ICCPR, supranote
129, art. 14, 2; Body of Principlesfor the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 195, princ. 36,1 1; StandardMinimum Rulesfor the
Treatmentof Prisoners,supra note 195, 84(2).
201 UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights, supra note 195, art. 11, 12.
202 Id. art. 12.
20 ICCPR, supranote 102, art. 14, 3(b) and (d); Basic Principleson the Role ofLawyers,
ch. 1, sec. B, 9M 1, 5, 6, 19, U.N. Sales No. E.91.IV.2 (1990); Body of Principlesfor the
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 195,
princs. 11, 14, 17.
204 Basic Principleson the Role ofLawyers, supranote 203, IN 8, 22; Body ofPrinciplesfor
the ProtectionofAll Persons UnderAny Form ofDetention or Imprisonment,supra note 195,
princ. 18.
2o0ICCPR, supra note 129, art. 14,9 3(b); Basic Principleson the Role ofLawyers, supra
note 203, 1 21; Body of Principlesfor the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 195, princ. 11-13, 17-18.
206 ICCPR,supra note 129, art. 9, 13; Body ofPrinciplesfor the ProtectionofA ll Persons
UnderAny Form of Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 195, princ. 39.
207 ICCPR, supra note 129, art. 14, 1 3(g); Body of Principlesfor the Protection of All
Persons Under Any ImprisonmentDetention, supra note 195, princ. 21.
' ICCPR,supranote 129, art. 14,1 3(e)
20- Id. art. 14, 15; Body of Principlesfor the Protection ofAll Persons Under Any Form of

Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 195, princ. 30, 2.
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offense more than once; 0 and the right to bring an action of habeas corpus
challenging the legality of his detainment. "l '
1. US. Military TribunalsMay Violate the ICCPR
Article 4 of the ICCPR, to which the United States is a party, permits states
to temporarily suspend compliance with some of the due process protections
required under Article 14 in a time of public emergency that "threatens the life
of the nation .... 2 ,2 The scope of allowable variances is limited to these
"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation... ,,2I3 If a state elects to
exercise its discretion to temporarily suspend due process protections, it is
required to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
provisions with which it has temporarily suspended compliance, and its
reasons for doing so.2 4
In a letter to President Bush dated December 6,2001, the Secretary-General
of the International Commission of Jurists, Louise Doswald-Beck, stated the
concern that some of the provisions of the Military Order may violate the
requirements of the ICCPR, and that the United States has provided no
notification to the United Nations Secretary-General of its intentions to
derogate from its obligations as a signatory state." 5 While some of these
concerns have been addressed by the rules released by the Defense Department
in March 2002, other concerns remain, including the absence of any provisions
to meet the requirements of ICCPR Article 9. These provisions include the
right of arrested persons to be informed of the charges against them, to be
brought promptly before a judicial authority, to challenge the lawfulness of
their detention, and to a trial or release within a reasonable time." 6 DoswaldBeck argued that the United States should not forego the opportunity to
demonstrate to the world the need for a society based on the rule of law, the

20 ICCPR, supra note 129, art. 14, 1 7; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, supra note 195, 30.
222 Body of Principlesfor the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment,supra note 195, princ. 32.
1.
2' ICCPR, supra note 129, art. 4,
213 Id.
214 Id. art. 4, 3.
22

Doswald-Beck, supra note 2.

226 Doswald-Beck, supra note 2; see also Military Order, supra note 31; Buzbee, supranote
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very destruction of which the terrorists who conducted the attacks of
September 11 are seeking to achieve. 17
In 1997, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations published the
following General Connent (No. 13) on the application of military justice to
civilians:
[t]he provisions of Article 14 [of the ICCPR] apply to all courts
and tribunals within the scope of that Article whether ordinary or
specialized. The Committee notes the existence, in many
countries, of military or special courts which try civilians. This
could present serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial
and independent administration of justice is concerned. Quite
often the reason for the establishment of such courts is to enable
exceptional procedures to be applied which do not comply with
normal standards ofjustice. While the Covenant does not prohibit
such categories of courts, nevertheless the conditions which it
lays down clearly indicate that the trying of civilians by such
courts should be very exceptional and take place under conditions
which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in Article
14 .... If States parties decide in circumstances of a public
emergency as contemplated by Article 4 to derogate from normal
procedures required under Article 14, they should ensure that
such derogations do not exceed those strictly required by the
exigencies of the actual situation, and respect the other conditions in paragraph I of Article 14."
The U.S. military tribunals therefore appear to be in violation of international
law.

2. US. Military TribunalsMay Violate the Geneva Convention
Critics have also charged that the Military Order violates the Geneva
Convention.2" 9 Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Geneva Convention Relative to
2,7 Doswald-Beck, supra note 2.

General Comment No. 13 of the Human Rights Committee, on Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comments Approved by the
Human CCPR/c/2 1/Rev. 1 (Dec. 8, 1997), cited in Inter-American Commission, supra note 3,
ch. 2,1 152.
'19 Geneva Convention Relative for Prisoners of War, supranote 14 1, art. 4. See also e.g.,
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the Treatment of Prisoners of War" ° defines prisoners of war with regard to
armed resistance groups, the category that members of al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups likely fall under, as follows:
[m]embers of other militias and members bf other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the
" '
laws and customs of war.22
It is likely that captured members of covert terrorist organizations such as al
Qaeda would fail the test for prisoners of war under criteria (b), (c), and (d)
above. Covert terrorists do not generally display distinctive signs or carry their
weapons openly (to the dismay of law enforcement officials worldwide), and
terrorist operations are generally not carried out in accordance with the laws
of war, which preclude, for example, targeting civilian populations as was
done in the September 11 attacks.' On the other hand, captured members of
the Taliban military, who comprised the military arm of the Afghan government, and perhaps even certain elements of al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan,
such as the al Qaeda 55th Brigade that was reportedly integrated with Taliban
military forces,' in all likelihood qualify as prisoners of war under the above

William Carlsen, US.Faces Tough Call on Use of Tribunals/EnemyPrisonersPush Complex
Choices on Bush, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26, 2001, at Al, availableat 2001 WL 3423460.
Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War, supra note 141, art. 4.
221Id.
I Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/htmi/
menu3/b/92.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Geneva Convention for Protection of
Civilians].
I Human Rights Watch, Legal Issues Arising from the War in Afghanistan and Related AntiTerrorism Efforts (Oct. 2001), availableat http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/septemberl I1/ihlqna.
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criteria. Because the Military Order includes all members of al Qaeda,
presumably including members of the 55th Brigade, and because its applicability to persons who "aided or abetted.
acts of international terrorism" or
who, "have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy"; or who
"knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i)
or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1).. ."' could be interpreted to include members of
the Taliban military, it could include persons who qualify as prisoners of war
under international law.
Some other portions of the Military Order seem to be at variance with the
requirements of the Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War. Article 102 of
the Convention states that prisoners of war can only be sentenced by the same
courts following the same procedures as those applied to members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power."2 In the case of United States armed
forces, this is the military courts martial procedure. While the regulations for
military tribunals follow some procedures of military courts martial, the fact
that the military tribunals will operate under separate procedures that differ in
some respects from military courts martial may violate the Geneva Convention.
For example, Article 106 of the Geneva Convention requires that prisoners of
war have the right of appeal in the same manner as members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power. 6 The Defense Department regulations
pertaining to appeal for military tribunals provide for a three-member appeals
panel, with the final determination on any verdict and sentence made by the
president."' Verdicts of military courts martial can be appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and ultimately to the United States Supreme
Court.m
Furthermore, Article 105 of the Geneva Convention requires that defense
counsel for prisoners of war have the ability to interview their clients in

private.' Recent changes to the United States Department of Justice Bureau
of Prisons regulation 28 CFR 501.3 permitting law enforcement officials to
monitor attorney/client communications when the government determines that
it is necessary to do so to deter future acts of violence or terrorism. The
pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
-' Miliary Order, supra note 31.

Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War, supra note 141, art. 4.
6 Id.
22 Buzbee, supra note 99.
"2 Review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C.A. § 867, art. 67 (2001).
Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War, supra note 141, art. 4.
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regulation does not explain how the government will make these determinations. This procedure appears to be at odds with Article 105 of the Conven23 0
tion.
3. PossibleEffects of Military Tribunals on InternationalRelations
In addition to concerns over violations of international law, the United
States' use of military tribunals raises concerns over their effect on relations
with other countries. In the past, the United States has routinely condemned
the use of military courts in other countries."' For example, the United States
has repeatedly criticized Peru's use of military tribunals to try civilians
accused of terrorism. 232 The State Department's 2000 Country Report on
Human Rights Practices charged that "proceedings in [Peruvian] military
courts ...
do not meet internationally accepted standards of openness, fairness,
and due process. '' 21 3 For example, in the case of U.S. citizen Lori Berenson,
convicted by a Peruvian military tribunal of terrorism, the State Department
called on Peru to retry Berenson "in open civilian court with full rights of legal
defense, in accordance with international judicial norms."'
The State Department has also criticized Egypt's use of military tribunals
to try persons accused of terrorism. In its criticism ofEgypt's military tribunal
process the State Department charged, "[t]his use ofmilitary and State Security
Emergency courts under the Emergency Law since 1993 has deprived
hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right to be tried by a
civilian judge." " The report continues:

"3

Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001).

"' Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to President George
W.Bush (Nov. 15, 2001), availableat http://www.hrw.orgpress/2001/1 1/miltribsltrl 115.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
232 United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Peru,
2000 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/dr/ris/hrrpt/2000/wha/827.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2003).
233Id.
' Roth, supra note 231.

United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Egypt
(2000), availableat http://www.state.gov/g/dr/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/784.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2003) (from the State Department's description in its criticism, Egypt's military tribunals appear
similar in many respects to those established by the Military Order in the United States a year
later).
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[t]he Government defends the use of military courts as necessary
in terrorism cases, maintaining that trials in the civilian courts are
protracted and that civilian judges and their families are vulnerable to terrorist threats. Some civilian judges have confirmed that
they [have a] fear of (sic) trying high visibility terrorism cases
because of possible reprisal. The Government claims that
civilian defendants receive fair trials in the military courts and
enjoy the same rights as defendants in civilian courts.
However, the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants
due process before an independent tribunal. While military
judges are lawyers, they are also military officers appointed by
the Minister of Defense and subject to military discipline. They
are neither as independent nor as qualified as civilian judges in
applying the civilian Penal Code. There is no appellate process
for verdicts issued by military courts; instead, verdicts are subject
to a review by other military judges and confirmation by the
president... 236
While the United States has had limited success in influencing other countries
to stop using military tribunals to try civilians and to improve legal due process
protections, it has arguably helped provide leverage to assist Americans who
faced trial in such courts overseas.237 Such leverage could be significantly
reduced if other countries perceive that the United States can no longer
criticize their system of military tribunals because it has adopted a similar
system, whether the similarity is real or perceived.
The scope of the application of military tribunals by the United States could
also have consequences for United States military personnel captured in future
conflicts overseas. If the president designates any of the more conventional
captured military personnel, such as Taliban troops or leaders, as unlawful
combatants in order to try them before military tribunals, a precedent could be
established under which other countries could similarly designate United
States military personnel engaged in campaigns that they consider illegitimate.
Such designations could strip away the protections for United States military

236

Id.

" Neil King Jr., Bush 'sPlan to Use Tribunal Will Hurt U.S. in Human-Rights Arena, Some
Say, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at A2, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29679021.
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personnel under the Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War, and allowing
their trial as war criminals before military tribunals. 3
Also, a number of foreign governments, including member states of the
European Union, are refusing to extradite suspected members of al Qaeda and
other terrorists captured since the September 11 attacks unless they receive
assurance from the U.S. government that the suspects will not be subject to the
death penalty. ' 9 The European Parliament passed a resolution on December
13, 2001 declaring that "no extradition can be allowed to the U.S. from EU
states" unless the United States reverses its policy on capital punishment and
the use of military tribunals.'
IV. CONCLUSIONS

There are significant differences between the military tribunals established
by President Bush in his Military Order and Peru's system of military tribunals
that led to the imprisonment of over 3,900 Peruvian citizens on charges of
terrorism, at least 600 of whom were innocent, and which earned Peru one of
the worst human rights reputations in the international community. One of the
primary differences is the legal background against which the two countries
established their tribunals. In establishing their tribunals, the Peruvian
president dissolved the country's Congress, replaced the majority of sitting
judges and prosecutors, and suspended a portion of the Peruvian Constitution,
while in the United States, its Constitution, legislature, and judiciary remain
intact. Persons in the United States, citizens and non-citizens alike, still enjoy
the full protection of the Constitution, although these protections are largely
not available to persons outside the country. Peru's military tribunal system
applies to its own citizens, replacing the judicial system for certain classes of
crimes. By contrast, the Military Order does not apply to United States
citizens, who still enjoy full access to the American judicial system.
Moreover, under Peru's military tribunals, defendants do not have access to
counsel until after they make a statement to the Public Ministry, potentially
" William Glaberson, Tribunals May Violate Conventions/Bush Order Conflicts With World
Law on Treatment of PO Ws, Critics Say, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 27,2001, at 17, available at

2001 WL 31483729.
" Ashcrofl Vows to Respect European Legal Norms in Terror Fight, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Sept. 17, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23602488.
240 T.R. Reid, EU Leaders Convene to Design 'Global Superpower'; Officials Are Unable
to Agree on Combined Military Forces, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at A35, available at 2001
WL 31543148.
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compromising their protection against self-incrimination. Under regulations
implementing the Military Order, however, defendants will have protection
against self-incrimination, although the effectiveness of this protection is
questionable in light of routine interrogations of detainees who are denied
access to counsel. Furthermore, in Peru, attorneys are prohibited from
representing more than one defendant accused of terrorism at a time,
compromising defendants' access to counsel of their choice. Under the United
States tribunal system, the government provides military counsel to defendants,
and they will be able to retain private counsel of their choice 2" if they have the
means to pay for it. Although Peru's "faceless" courts have now been
abolished, the secrecy under which they operated when active was extreme;
judges and prosecutors either wore hoods to cover their faces, or sat in a
separate room from the defendant and his counsel, communicating though
voice-distorting microphones. In contrast, trials under U.S. military tribunals
will be open to the public and the press except when classified information
must be protected. Still, there are provisions for security measures that are
disturbingly similar to Peru's "faceless" courts in cases where the government
deems it necessary to protect judges, prosecutors, and witnesses from fears of
retaliation. Lastly, defendants tried by Peru's military tribunals are not
afforded the opportunity to confront all of their accusers because of a
prohibition on the appearance as witnesses at trial of police or military
personnel who interrogated the defendant. The law also provides for secret
witnesses whose identities are kept from the defense throughout the trial. The
regulations for United States military tribunals provide defendants with access
to prosecution witnesses for cross-examination, and evidence, "to the extent
reasonably available," although some witnesses may testify via telephone or
closed-circuit television, and defendants and civilian counsel will not be
permitted access to evidence the governments deems classified.
However, while it is clear that the United States' system of military
tribunals offers considerably more protection of defendants' rights to due
process than those of Peru, there are still areas of concern over both the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the United States military tribunals,
and possible violations of international law.
It is not clear that the military tribunals have jurisdiction under U.S. law to
try persons not directly involved with the September 11 attacks. While it can
be reasonably argued that Congress' authorization to use "all necessary and

"' Neil A.Lewis, OfficialsDraflRulesforMilitaryTribunals,MILWAUKEE J.SENTINEL, Dec.
28, 2001, at Al, available at WL 27445175.
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appropriate force" includes authority for the president to establish military
tribunals to try those charged with offenses related to the September 11
attacks, the Military Order's application of military tribunals to acts not
directly associated with the September 11 attacks, including membership in al
Qaeda, other acts of international terrorism, and harboring such persons, goes
beyond Congressional authorization. While U.S. case law clearly establishes
that military tribunals have jurisdiction over persons who commit war crimes,
the Military Order potentially applies to a much broader group. It is not clear
that membership in al Qaeda, or harboring terrorists, taken alone constitute a
war crime, which is the necessary predicate to the jurisdiction of a military
tribunal under both common law and U.C.M.J. Article 21. It also remains
unclear that all acts of international terrorism are necessarily violations of the
law of war. Neither current Congressional authorization nor case law appear
to support the jurisdiction of military tribunals to persons charged with
offenses not directly related to the September 11 attacks, and the president's
authority to establish military tribunals based solely on his position as
commander-in-chief is uncertain. Additional specific authority from Congress
appears necessary in order to apply the military tribunals to the full extent
stated in the Military Order.
Another concern under U.S. law relates to the applicability of the Military
Order to non-citizens inside the United States. While non-citizens outside the
United States have few if any protections under the Constitution, the due
process protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are guaranteed to all
persons within the United States, not just citizens. In deciding jurisdiction of
military tribunals over persons in the United States, the Supreme Court has
relied on distinctions between belligerents and non-belligerents, and suggested
that there could be an exception grantingjurisdiction over persons who entered
the country illegally in order to commit a crime. The constitutionality of
jurisdiction over non-citizens in the United States under the current circumstances remains uncertain.
Furthermore, the United States military tribunals may not comply with the
requirements of Article 9 of the ICCPR because of the lack of any provisions
in either the Military Order or the military tribunal regulations to meet its
requirements. The requirements in question include the right of arrested
persons to be informed of the charges against them, to be brought promptly
before a judicial authority, to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, and
to a trial or release within a reasonable time.
Moreover, some provisions of the Military Order appear to be in violation
of the Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War. While persons engaged in
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covert terrorist operations clearly do not qualify as prisoners of war under the
criteria established in Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Geneva Convention for
Prisoners of War, and are thus not protected by its provisions, captured
members of the Taliban military who could be included under the Military
Order do qualify as prisoners of war. Article 102 of the Geneva Convention
for Prisoners of War requires trial by the same courts following the same
procedures as those applied to members of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power, to include military courts-martial in the case of the United States.
United States military tribunals will follow some but not all of the same
procedures as military courts-martial, and thus may violate Article 102.
Article 106 of the Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War requires that
prisoners of war have the right of appeal in the same manner as members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power. The regulations for military tribunals
provide for a three-person appeals panel, with the final determination on any
verdict and sentence made by the president. Verdicts of military courts martial
can be appealed to the civilian Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and
ultimately to the United States Supreme Court. This difference also appears
to violate Article 106.
Article 105 of the Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War requires that
defense counsel for prisoners of war have the ability to interview their clients
in private. Recent changes to the United States Department of Justice Bureau
of Prisons regulation 28 CFR 501.3 permitting law enforcement officials to
monitor attorney-client communications under certain circumstances appear
to be at variance with this requirement.
In sum, United States military tribunals are likely to provide significantly
more due process protections than those of Peru, and are unlikely to result in
widespread human rights abuses like those experienced by Peru's citizens.
However, depending on the scope with which the tribunals are used and how
the implementing regulations are used in practice, the potential exists for
violations of both the United States Constitution and international law,
specifically the ICCPR and the Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War.

